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Abstract
Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing (TPASS) protocols allow a
client to distribute a secret s amongst n servers and protect it with a pass-
word pw, so that the client can later recover the secret s from any subset of t
of the servers using the password pw. In this paper, we present two efficient
TPASS protocols, one is built on two-phase commitment and has lower compu-
tation complexity, and another is based on zero-knowledge proof and has less
communication rounds. Both protocols are in particular efficient for the client,
who only needs to send a request and receive a response. In addition, we have
provided rigorous proofs of security for the proposed protocols in the standard
model. The experimental results have shown that the proposed two TPASS
protocols are more efficient than Camenisch et al.’s protocols and save up to
85% – 95% total computational time and up to 65% – 75% total communication
overhead.
Keywords: Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing protocol,
ElGamal encryption scheme, Shamir secret sharing scheme, Diffie-Hellman
problems
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1. Introduction
Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing (TPASS) protocols con-
sider a scenario [6], inspired by the movie “Memento” in which the main char-
acter suffers from short-term memory loss, leads to an interesting cryptographic
problem, can a user securely recover his secrets from a set of servers, if all the5
user can or wants to remember is a single password and all of the servers may
be adversarial? In particular, can he protect his previous password when acci-
dentally trying to run the recovery with all-malicious servers? A solution for
this problem can act as a natural bridge from human-memorisable passwords
to strong keys for cryptographic tasks.10
A typical application of TPASS is to protect user data in cloud computing
environments, where a client encrypts his data with a random key before up-
loading it to a data server in the cloud, then secretly shares the random key
together with a password with n key servers in the cloud. When he needs the
key to decrypt his data downloaded from the data server, he recovers the key15
from any subset of t of the n key servers using his password. Therefore, to
protect his data in the cloud, the client needs to remember his password only.
This process can be illustrated in Fig. 1, where we assume that the gateway
forwards messages between the client and key servers.
Figure 1: Cloud Security with TPASS
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The first TPASS protocol was given by Bagherzandi et al. [2] in 2011. It is20
built on the PKI model, secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption,
using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The basic idea is as follows: a
client initially generates an ElGamal private and public key pairs (sk, pk = gsk)
[8] and secret-shares sk among servers using an t-out-of-n secret sharing [16]
and outputs public parameters including the public key pk and the encryptions25
E(gpw, pk) and E(s, pk) of password pw and secret s, respectively, under the
public key pk. When retrieving the secret from the servers, the client encrypts
the password pw′ he remembers and send the encryption E(gpw
′
, pk) to the
servers, each of which computes and returns Ai = [E(g
pw, pk)/E(gpw
′
, pk)]ri =
E(gri(pw−pw
′), pk), where ri is randomly chosen. The client then computes A =30 ∏n
i=1Ai and sends it to the servers. In the end, t servers cooperate to decrypt
B = E(s, pk)A = E(sg
∑
ri(pw−pw′), pk) and sends partial decryptions to the
client through secure channels, respectively. When pw′ = pw, the client is able
to retrieve the secret s by combining t partial decryptions. This protocol is
secure against honest-but-curious adversaries but not malicious adversaries. A35
protocol against malicious adversaries was also given by Bagherzandi et al. [2]
using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. In Bagherzandi et al. protocol, it
is easy to see that the client must correctly remember the public key pk and
the exact set of servers, as he or she sends out an encryption of his or her
password attempt pw′ he or she remembers. If pk can be tampered with and40
changed so that the adversary knows the decryption key, then the adversary
can decrypt pw′. Although the protocol actually encrypts gpw
′
, the malicious
servers can perform an offline dictionary attack on gpw
′
to obtain the password
pw′. In addition, even if the client can correctly remember the public key pk, the
malicious servers can cheat the client with a different secret s′ by sending the45
partial decryptions of B′ = E(s′, pk)A instead of B = E(s, pk)A to the client.
An 1-out-of-2 TPASS was given by Camenisch et al. [5] in 2012. This protocol
also leaks the password when the client tries to retrieve his or her secret from a
set of all-malicious servers.
Authenticating to the wrong servers is a common scenario when users are50
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tricked in phishing attacks. To overcome this shortcoming, Camenisch et al. [6]
proposed the first t-out-of-n TPASS protocol for any n > t in 2014. The protocol
requires the client to only remember a username and a password, assuming that
a PKI is available. If the client misremembers his or her list of servers and tries to
retrieve his or her secret from corrupt servers, the protocol prevents the servers55
from learning anything about the password or secret, as well as from planting a
different secret into the user’s mind than the secret that he or she stored earlier.
The construction of Camenisch et al. protocol is inspired by Bagherzandi et al.
protocol based on a homomorphic threshold encryption scheme, but the crucial
difference is that in the retrieval protocol of Camenisch et al., the client never60
sends out an encryption of his or her password attempt. Instead, the client
derives an encryption of the (randomised) quotient of the password used at
setup and the password attempt. The servers then jointly decrypt the quotient
and verify whether it yields “1”, indicating that both passwords matched. In
case the passwords were not the same, all the servers learn is a random value.65
Camenisch et al. TPASS protocol [6], proved to be secure in the UC frame-
work, requires the client to involve in many communication rounds so that it
becomes impractical for the client. The client has to do 5n+15 exponentiations
in G for the setup protocol and 14t + 24 exponentiations in the retrieval pro-
tocol. Each server has to perform n + 18 and 7t + 28 exponentiations in these70
respective protocols.
Recently, Abdalla et al. [1] proposed new robust password-protected secret
sharing protocols which are significantly more efficient than the existing ones.
Their protocols have been proven in the random-oracle model, because their
construction requires random non-malleable fingerprints, which is provided by75
an ideal hash function. In addition, Jarecki et al. [11] constructed password-
protected secret sharing protocols based on oblivious pseudorandom functions,
formulated as a universally composable (UC) functionality.
Our Contribution. To improve the efficiency of TPASS, we propose two new
t-out-of-n TPASS protocols for any n > t in this paper. One protocol is built80
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on two-phase commitment and has lower computation complexity. Another
protocol is built on zero-knowledge proof and has less communication rounds.
Both protocols are in particular efficient for the client, who only needs to send
a request and receive a response.
The basic idea is as follows: a client initially secret-shares a password, a85
secret and the digest of the secret with n servers, such as t out of the n servers
can recover the secret. When retrieving the secret from the servers, the client
submits to the servers A = gr1g
pwC
2 , where r is randomly chosen and pwC is the
password, and then t servers cooperate to generate and return an ElGamal en-
cryption of the secret and an ElGamal encryption of the digest of the secret, both90
under the public key gr1. We use two-phase commitment and zero-knowledge
proof to prevent the collusion attack from up to t− 1 malicious servers. At the
end, the client then decrypts the two ciphertexts and accepts the secret if one
decrypted value is another’s digest.
The proposed protocols are significantly more efficient than Camenisch et95
al. protocol [6] in terms of computational and communication complexities. In
the proposed protocols, the client only needs to send a request and receive a
response. In addition, the client needs to do 3n evaluations of polynomials of
degree t − 1 in Zq for the initialization and 7 exponentiations for the retrieval
protocol. Each server only needs to do t+10 (in two-phase commitment case) or100
3t+10 (in one-phase zero-knowledge proof case) exponentiations in the retrieval
protocol. The computation and communication complexities for the client are
independent of the number of the servers n and the threshold t.
We have provided rigorous proof of security for the proposed protocols in
the standard model. Like Camenisch et al. protocol [6], the proposed protocols105
can protect the password of the client even if he or she communicates with all-
malicious servers by mistake. In addition, they prevent the servers from planting
a different secret into the user’s mind than the secret that he stored earlier.
This paper is an extended version of our conference paper [20]. In this
extension, we have added a new TPASS protocol based on zero-knowledge proof,110
which reduces the communications among servers from two phases to one phase.
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In addition, we provide a rigorous proof of security for the new protocol in
the standard model, and performed some experiments on the proposed two
protocols.
Related Works. A close work related to TPASS is threshold password - authen-115
ticated key exchange (TPAKE), which lets the client agree on a fresh session
key with each of the servers, but does not allow the client to store and re-
cover a secret. Depending on the desired security properties, one can build a
TPASS scheme from a TPAKE scheme by using the agreed-upon session keys
to transmit the stored secret shares over secure channels [2].120
The first TPAKE protocols, due to Ford and Kaliski [9] and Jablon [10],
were not proved secure. The first provably secure TPAKE protocol, a t-out-of-n
protocol in a PKI setting, was proposed by MacKenzie et al. [14]. The 1-out-
of-2 protocol of Brainard et al. [4] is implemented in EMC’s RSA Distributed
Credential Protection. Both protocols either leak the password or allow an125
offline dictionary attack when the retrieval is performed with corrupt servers.
The t-out-of-n TPAKE protocols by Di Raimondo and Gennaro [15] and the
1-out-of-2 protocol by Katz et al. [13] are proved secure in a hybrid password-
only/PKI setting, where the user does not know any public keys, but the servers
and an intermediate gateway do have a PKI. These protocols actually remain130
secure when executed with all-corrupt servers, but are restricted to the cases
that n > 3t and (t, n) = (1, 2). Based on identity-based encryption (IBE), an
1-out-of-2 protocol where the client is required to remember the identities of the
two servers besides his or her password, was proposed by Yi et al. [19].
Organization. The rest of our paper is organised as follows. We give the security135
definition in Section 2, describe the proposed TPASS protocols in Section 3,
provide the security proof for the proposed protocols in Section 4, analyze the
performance of the proposed protocols in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in
the last section.
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2. Definition of Security140
In this section, we define the security for TPASS protocol on the basis of the
security models for PAKE [3, 12].
Participants, Initialization, Passwords, Secrets. A TPASS protocol in-
volves three kinds of protocol participants: (1) A group of clients (denoted as
Client), each of which requests TPASS services from t servers on the network;145
(2) A group of n servers S1,S2, · · · ,Sn (denoted as Server = {S1,S2, · · · ,Sn}),
which cooperate to provide TPASS services to clients on the network; (3) A gate-
way (GW), which coordinates TPASS. We assume that User = Client
⋃
Server
and Client
⋂
Server = ∅. When the gateway GW coordinates TPASS, it simply
forwards messages between a client and t servers.150
Prior to any execution of the protocol, we assume that an initialization
phase occurs. During initialization, the n servers cooperate to generate public
parameters for the protocol, which are available to all participants.
We assume that the client C chooses its password pwC independently and
uniformly at random from a “dictionary” D = {pw1, pw2, · · · , pwN} of size N ,155
where N is a fixed constant which is independent of any security parameter.
The client then secretly shares the password with the n servers such that any t
servers can restore the password.
In addition, we assume that the client C chooses its secret sC independently
and uniformly at random from Z∗q , where q is a public parameter. The client160
then secretly shares the secret with the n servers such that any t servers can
recover the secret.
We assume that at least n − t + 1 servers are trusted not to collude to
determine the password and the secret of the client. The client C needs to
remember pwC only to retrieve its secret sC .165
Execution of the Protocol. A protocol determines how users behave in
response to input from their environments. In the formal model, these inputs
are provided by the adversary. Each user is assumed to be able to execute the
protocol multiple times (possibly concurrently) with different partners. This
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is modeled by allowing each user to have unlimited number of instances with170
which to execute the protocol. We denote instance i of user U as U i. A given
instance may be used only once. The adversary is given oracle access to these
different instances. Furthermore, each instance maintains (local) state which
is updated during the course of the experiment. In particular, each instance
U i is associated with the following variables, initialized as NULL or FALSE (as175
appropriate) during the initialization phase.
• sidiU is a variable containing the session identity for an instance U i. The
session identity is simply a way to keep track of the different executions of
a particular user U . Without loss of generality, we simply let this be the
(ordered) concatenation of all messages sent and received by instance U i.180
• siC is a variable containing the secret sC for a client instance Ci. Retrieval
of the secret is, of course, the ultimate goal of the protocol.
• acciU and termiU are boolean variables denoting whether a given instance
U i has been accepted or terminated, respectively. Termination means that
the given instance has done receiving and sending messages, acceptance185
indicates successful termination. When an instance U i has been accepted,
sidiU is no longer NULL. When a client instance C
i has been accepted, siC
is no longer NULL.
• stateiU records any state necessary for execution of the protocol by U i.
• usediU is a boolean variable denoting whether an instance U i has begun190
executing the protocol. This is a formalism which will ensure each instance
is used only once.
The adversary A is assumed to have complete control over all communica-
tions in the network (between the clients and servers, and between servers and
servers) and the adversary’s interaction with the users (more specifically, with195
various instances) is modelled via access to oracles. The state of an instance
may be updated during an oracle call, and the oracle’s output may depend upon
the relevant instance. The oracle types include:
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• Send(C, i,M) – This sends message M to a client instance Ci. Assuming
termiC = FALSE, this instance runs according to the protocol specification,200
updating state as appropriate. The output of Ci (i.e., the message sent by
the instance) is given to the adversary, who receives the updated values
of sidiC , acc
i
C , and term
i
C . This oracle call models an active attack to the
protocol. If M is empty, this query represents a prompt for C to initiate
the protocol.205
• Send(S, j, U,M) – This sends message M to a server instance Sj , suppos-
edly from a user U (either a client or a server) or even a set of servers.
Assuming termjS = FALSE, this instance runs according to the protocol
specification, updating state as appropriate. The output of Sj (i.e., the
message sent by the instance) is given to the adversary, who receives the210
updated values of sidjS , acc
j
S , and term
j
S . If S is corrupted, the adversary
also receives the entire internal state of S. This oracle call also models an
active attack to the protocol.
• Execute(C, i,S) – If the client instance Ci and t server instances, denoted
as S, have not yet been used, this oracle executes the protocol between215
these instances and outputs the transcript of this execution. This oracle
call represents passive eavesdropping of a protocol execution. In addition
to the transcript, the adversary receives the values of sid, acc, and term for
client and server instances, at each step of protocol execution. In addition,
if any server in S is corrupted, the adversary is given the entire internal220
state of the server.
• Corrupt(S) – This sends the password and secret shares of all clients stored
in the server S to the adversary. This oracle models possible compromising
of a server due to, for example, hacking into the server.
• Corrupt(C) – This query allows the adversary to learn the password of225
the client C and then the secret of the client, which models the possibility
of subverting a client by, for example, witnessing a user typing in his
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password, or installing a “Trojan horse” on his machine.
• Test(C, i) – This oracle does not model any real-world capability of the
adversary, but is instead used to define security. If acciC = TRUE, a230
random bit b is generated. If b = 0, the adversary is given siC , and if b = 1
the adversary is given a random number. The adversary is allowed only a
single Test query, at any time during its execution.
Correctness. To be viable, a TPASS protocol must satisfy the following notion
of correctness: If a client instance Ci and t server instances S runs an honest235
execution of the protocol with no interference from the adversary, then acciC =
accjS = TRUE for any server instance S
j in S.
Freshness. To formally define the adversary’s success we need to define a
notion of freshness for a client, where freshness of the client is meant to indicate
that the adversary does not trivially know the value of the secret of the client.240
We say a client instance Ci is fresh if (1) C has not been corrupted; (2) Test(C)
has not been queried; and (3) at least n−t+1 out of n servers are not corrupted.
Advantage of the Adversary. We consider passive and active attacks, re-
spectively. In a passive attack, the adversary is allowed to call Execute, Corrupt
and Test oracles. Informally, a passive adversary succeeds if it can guess the bit
b used by the Test oracle. We say a passive adversary A succeeds if it makes a
query Test(C, i) to a fresh client instance Ci, with acciC = TRUE at the time of
this query, and outputs a bit b′ with b′ = b (recall that b is the bit chosen by
the Test oracle). We denote this event by SuccP. The advantage of a passive
adversary A in attacking protocol P is then given by
AdvPPA(k) = 2 · Pr[SuccP]− 1
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by the adversary
and the random coins used during the course of the experiment (including the
initialization phase).245
Definition 1. Protocol P is a secure TPASS protocol against the passive attack,
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if, for all passive PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such
that for a security parameter k,
AdvPPA(k) ≤ ε(k)
In an active attack, the adversary is allowed to call Send and Corrupt oracles.
Informally, an active adversary succeeds if it can convince a client to accept a
wrong secret key. We say an active adversary A succeeds if it makes an query
Send(C, i) to a fresh client instance Ci, resulting in acciC = TRUE. We denote
this event by SuccA. The advantage of an active adversary A in attacking
protocol P is then given by
AdvPAA(k) = Pr[SuccA]
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by the adversary
and the random coins used during the course of the experiment (including the
initialization phase).
The active adversary can always succeed by trying all passwords one-by-
one in an on-line impersonation attack. A protocol is secure against the active250
attack if this is the best an adversary can do. The on-line attacks correspond to
Send queries. Formally, each instance for which the adversary has made a Send
query counts as one on-line attack. The number of on-line attacks represents a
bound on the number of passwords the adversary could have tested in an on-line
fashion.255
Definition 2. Protocol P is a secure TPASS protocol against the active attack
if, for all dictionary size N and for all active PPT adversaries A making at
most Q(k) on-line attacks, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that for a
security parameter k,
AdvPAA(k) ≤ Q(k)/N + ε(k)
3. The Proposed TPASS Protocols
In this section, we describe two TPASS protocols based on two-phase com-
mitment protocol and zero-knowledge proof, respectively.
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3.1. The Proposed Protocol Based on Two-Phase Commitment
Initialization. Given a security parameter k ∈ Z∗, the initialization includes:260
Parameter Generation: On input k, the n servers agree on a cyclic group G of
large prime order q with a generator g1 and a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
Then the n servers cooperate to generate g2, like [18], such that no one knows
the discrete logarithm of g2 based on g1 if one out of the n server is honest. The
public parameters for the protocol is params = {G, q, g1, g2, H}.265
Password Generation: On input params, each client C ∈ Client with identity
IDC uniformly draws a string pwC , the password, from the dictionary D =
{pw1, pw2, · · · , pwN}. The client then randomly chooses a polynomial f1(x) of
degree t − 1 over Zq such that pwC = f1(0), and distributes {IDC , i, f1(i)} to
the server Si via a secure channel, where i = 1, 2, · · · , n.270
Secret Sharing: On input params, each client C ∈ Client randomly chooses s
from Z∗q . The client then randomly chooses two polynomials f2(x) and f3(x)
of degree t− 1 over Zq such that s = f2(0) and H(gs2) = f3(0), and distributes
{IDC , i, f2(i), f3(i)} to the server Si via a secure channel, where i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
We define the secret sC as g
s
2.275
Protocol Execution. Given the public params = {G, q, g1, g2, H}, the client
C (knowing its identity IDC and password pwC) runs TPASS protocol P with
t servers (each server knowing {IDC , i, f1(i), f2(i), f3(i)}) to retrieve the secret
sC as shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, TPASS protocol is executed with three algorithms as follows.280
Retrieval Request. Given the public parameters {G, g1, g2, q,H}, the client C
with the identity IDC validates if q is a large prime and g
q
1 = g
q
2 = 1. If so,
the client, who remembers the password pwC , randomly chooses r from Z∗q and
computes
A = gr1g
−pwC
2 .
Then the client submits msgC = 〈IDC , A〉 to the gateway GW for the n servers.
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Public: G, q, g1, g2, H
Client C
IDC , pwC
Server Si
{IDC , i, f1(i), f2(i), f3(i)}
i = 1, 2, · · · , tr
R← Z∗q
A = gr1g
−pwC
2
-msgC = 〈IDC , A〉 Gateway
GW
-msgC = 〈IDC , A〉
S = {S1,S2, · · · , St}
ri, ci, di
R← Z∗q , ai =
∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=i
j
j−i
Bi = g
ri
1 g
aif1(i)
2
Ci = g
ci
1 , Di = g
di
1
δi = g
H(IDC ,A,Bi,Ci,Di)
1
msgi = 〈IDC , δi, Bi, Ci, Di〉
-
〈IDC , δi〉, i = 1, 2, · · · , t
Si broadcasts commit in S
Phase 1
-
〈IDC , Bi, Ci, Di〉, i = 1, 2, · · · , t
Si broadcasts opening in S
Phase 2
if δj = g
H(IDc,A,Bj ,Cj ,Dj)
1 (1 ≤ j ≤ t)
C =
∏t
j=1 Cj , D =
∏t
j=1Dj
hi = H(IDC , A, C,D)
Ei = g
aif2(i)hi
2 C
−ri (A
∏t
j=1Bj)
ci
Fi = g
aif3(i)hi
2 D
−ri (A
∏t
j=1Bj)
di
accSi = TRUE
else return ⊥
ffmsg
∗
i = 〈IDC , C,D,Ei, Fi〉Gateway
GW
E =
∏t
i=1 Ei
F =
∏t
i=1 Fi
ffmsgS = 〈IDC , C,D,E, F 〉
h = H(IDC , A, C,D)
S = (E/Cr)h
−1
T = (F/Dr)h
−1
if T = g
H(S)
2 , accC = TRUE
else return ⊥
Figure 2: The Proposed TPASS Protocol P Based on Two-Phase Commitment
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Remark. The purpose for the client to validate the public parameters is to
ensure that the discrete logarithm over {G, q, g1, g2} is hard in case that the
adversary can change the public parameters.
Retrieval Response. After receiving the request msgC from the client C, the285
gateway GW forwards it to t available servers to response the request. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that the first t servers, denoted as S =
{S1,S2, · · · ,St}, cooperate to generate a response. There are two phases for
the t servers to generate retrieval response.
Commitment Phase. Based on the identity IDC of the client, each server Si
(i = 1, 2, · · · , t) randomly chooses ri, ci, di from Z∗q and computes
Bi = g
ri
1 g
aif1(i)
2 , Ci = g
ci
1 , Di = g
di
1 , δi = g
H(IDC ,A,Bi,Ci,Di)
1
where ai =
∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=i
j
j−i .290
In the commitment phase, Si broadcasts its commitment 〈IDC , δi〉.
Opening Phase. After receiving all commitments 〈IDC , δj〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ t), Si
broadcasts its opening 〈IDC , Bi, Ci, Di〉.
Each server Si verifies if δj = g
H(IDC ,A,Bj ,Cj ,Dj)
1 for all j 6= i. If so, based
on the identity IDC of the client, Si computes
C =
t∏
j=1
Cj , D =
t∏
j=1
Dj , hi = H(IDC , A,C,D)
Ei = g
aif2(i)hi
2 C
−ri(A
t∏
j=1
Bj)
ci , Fi = g
aif3(i)hi
2 D
−ri(A
t∏
j=1
Bj)
di
and sets accSi = TRUE.
Then Si sends msg
∗
i = {IDC , C,D,Ei, Fi} to the gateway GW.295
The gateway GW computes
E =
t∏
i=1
Ei, F =
t∏
i=1
Fi
and returns to the client with msgS = {IDC , C,D,E, F}.
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Secret Retrieval. After receiving the response msgS = {IDC , C,D,E, F} from
the gateway, the client computes
h = H(IDC , A,C,D), S = (E/C
r)h
−1
, T = (F/Dr)h
−1
and verifies if T = g
H(S)
2 . If so, the client sets accC = TRUE, the secret sC = S
and ⊥ otherwise.
Remark. In the end of the protocol, the servers can check if the password
attempt is correct or not by one more step, where the servers provide the client300
with a ciphertext for decryption, assuming that the client initially stores a pair of
plaintext and ciphertext in the servers. If the client can return a decrypted result
same as the plaintext stored in the servers previously, the password attempt
is correct. Otherwise, the servers should block the account after several failed
attempts. In this way, the proposed protocol can prevent the Distributed Denial-305
of-Service (DDoS) attack efficiently and effectively.
3.2. The Proposed Protocol Based on Zero-Knowledge Proof
Initialization. The initialization is the same as described in Section 3.1.
Protocol Execution. Given the public params = {G, q, g1, g2, H}, the client
C (knowing its identity IDC and password pwC) runs TPASS protocol P with t310
servers (each server knowing {ID, i, f1(i), f2(i), f3(i)}) to retrieve the secret sC
as shown in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3, TPASS protocol is executed with three algorithms as follows.
Retrieval Request. Given the public parameters {G, g1, g2, q,H}, the client C
with the identity IDC validates if q is a large prime and g
q
1 = g
q
2 = 1. If so,
the client, who remembers the password pwC , randomly chooses r from Z∗q and
computes
A = gr1g
−pwC
2 .
Then the client submits msgC = 〈IDC , A〉 to the gateway GW for the n servers.
Retrieval Response. After receiving the request msgC from the client C, the315
gateway GW forwards it to t available servers to respond the request. With-
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Public: G, q, g1, g2, H
Client C
IDC , pwC
Server Si
{IDC , i, f1(i), f2(i), f3(i)}
i = 1, 2, · · · , tr
R← Z∗q
A = gr1g
−pwC
2
-msgC = 〈IDC , A〉 Gateway
GW
-msgC = 〈IDC , A〉
S = {S1, S2, · · · ,St}
ri, ci, di
R← Z∗q , ai =
∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=i
j
j−i
Bi = g
ri
1 g
aif1(i)
2
Ci = g
ci
1 , Di = g
di
1
hi = H(IDC , A,Bi, Ci, Di), Hi = H(hi)
δi = hici +Hidi(mod q) (ZKP)
-
msgi = 〈IDC , Bi, Ci, Di, δi〉
Si broadcasts msgi in S
for j = 1 to t where j 6= i
{hj = H(IDC , A,Bj , Cj , Dj), Hj = H(hj)}
if g
δj
1 = C
hj
j D
Hj
j (1 ≤ j ≤ t where j 6= i)
{C =∏tj=1 Cj , D =∏tj=1Dj
h = H(IDC , A, C,D)
Ei = g
aif2(i)h
2 C
−ri (A
∏t
j=1Bj)
ci
Fi = g
aif3(i)h
2 D
−ri (A
∏t
j=1Bj)
di
accSi = TRUE}
else return ⊥
ffmsg
∗
i = 〈IDC , C,D,Ei, Fi〉Gateway
GW
E =
∏t
i=1 Ei
F =
∏t
i=1 Fi
ffmsgS = 〈IDC , C,D,E, F 〉
h = H(IDC , A, C,D)
S = (E/Cr)h
−1
T = (F/Dr)h
−1
if T = g
H(S)
2 , accC = TRUE
else return ⊥
Figure 3: The Proposed TPASS Protocol P Based on Zero-Knowledge Proof
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out loss of generality, we assume that the first t servers, denoted as S =
{S1,S2, · · · ,St}, cooperate to generate a response. Unlike the proposed pro-
tocol based on two-phase commitment, the t servers can generate the response
in one phase.320
Based on the identity IDC of the client, each server Si (i = 1, 2, · · · , t)
randomly chooses ri, ci, di from Z∗q and computes
Bi = g
ri
1 g
aif1(i)
2 , Ci = g
ci
1 , Di = g
di
1 ,
hi = H(IDC , A,Bi, Ci, Di), Hi = H(hi), δi = hici +Hidi(mod q),
where ai =
∏
1≤j≤t,j 6=i
j
j−i , (Ci, Di, δi) is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
of (ci, di).
Then Si broadcasts msgi = 〈IDC , Bi, Ci, Di, δi〉 in S.
Each server Si computes
hj = H(IDC , A,Bj , Cj , Dj), Hj = H(hj)
for all j 6= i and verifies the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of (cj , dj) by
checking if
g
δj
1 = C
hj
j D
Hj
j
for all j 6= i. If so, based on the identity IDC of the client, Si computes
C =
t∏
j=1
Cj , D =
t∏
j=1
Dj , h = H(IDC , A,C,D)
Ei = g
aif2(i)h
2 C
−ri(A
t∏
j=1
Bj)
ci , Fi = g
aif3(i)h
2 D
−ri(A
t∏
j=1
Bj)
di
and sets accSi = TRUE.
Then Si sends msg
∗
i = {IDC , C,D,Ei, Fi} to the gateway GW.325
The gateway GW computes
E =
t∏
i=1
Ei, F =
t∏
i=1
Fi
and returns to the client with msgS = {IDC , C,D,E, F}.
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Secret Retrieval. After receiving the response msgS = {IDC , C,D,E, F} from
the gateway, the client computes
h = H(IDC , A,C,D), S = (E/C
r)h
−1
, T = (F/Dr)h
−1
and verifies if T = g
H(S)
2 . If so, the client sets accC = TRUE, the secret sC = S
and ⊥ otherwise.
3.3. Correctness
Correctness of the Proposed TPASS protocol based on two-phase330
commitment. Assume that a client instance Ci and t server instances S run
an honest execution of the proposed TPASS protocol P with no interference
from the adversary. With reference to Fig. 2, it is obvious that accSj = TRUE
for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. In addition, we have
C =
t∏
j=1
Cj = g
∑t
j=1 cj
1 , D =
t∏
j=1
Dj = g
∑t
j=1 dj
1
Ei = g
aif2(i)hi
2 C
−ri(A
t∏
j=1
Bj)
ci
= g
aif2(i)hi
2 g
−ri
∑t
j=1 cj
1 (g
r
1g
−pwC
2 g
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
pwC
2 )
ci
= g
aif2(i)hi
2 g
−ri
∑t
j=1 cj
1 g
ci
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
cir
1
Fi = g
aif3(i)hi
2 D
−ri(A
t∏
j=1
Bj)
di
= g
aif3(i)hi
2 g
−ri
∑t
j=1 dj
1 (g
r
1g
−pwC
2 g
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
pwC
2 )
di
= g
aif3(i)hi
2 g
−ri
∑t
j=1 dj
1 g
di
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
dir
1
h = H(IDC , A,C,D)
E =
t∏
i=1
Ei =
t∏
i=1
g
aif2(i)h
2 g
−ri
∑t
j=1 cj
1 g
ci
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
cir
1
= gsh2 g
−∑ti=1 ri∑tj=1 cj
1 g
∑t
i=1 ci
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
r
∑t
i=1 ci
1 = g
sh
2 C
r
F =
t∏
i=1
Fi =
t∏
i=1
g
aif3(i)h
2 g
−ri
∑t
j=1 dj
1 g
di
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
dir
1
= g
H(gs2)h
2 g
−∑ti=1 ri∑tj=1 dj
1 g
∑t
i=1 di
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
r
∑t
i=1 di
1 = g
H(gs2)h
2 D
r
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We can see that (C,E) and (D,F ) are in fact the EGamal encryptions of gsh2 and335
g
H(gs)h
2 under the public key g
r
1, respectively. Therefore, we have accC = TRUE
because
h = H(IDC , A,C,D)
S = (E/Cr)h
−1
= (gsh2 )
h−1 = gs2
T = (F/Dr)h
−1
= (g
H(gs2)h
2 )
h−1 = g
H(gs2)
2
T = g
H(S)
2 .
In summary, the proposed TPASS protocol based on two-phase commitment
has correctness.
Correctness of the proposed TPASS protocol based on zero-knowledge340
proof. Comparing the proposed two protocols shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we
can see that there are two differences: (1) δi is computed differently; (2) δi is
verified differently. Therefore, we only need to show that g
δj
1 = C
hj
j D
Hj
j for
j = 1, 2, · · · , t for the second proposed protocol if each server Si follows the
protocol to compute Bi, Ci, Di and δi.345
Because Cj = g
cj
1 , Dj = g
dj
1 , δj = hjcj +Hjdj for j = 1, 2, · · · , t, we have
g
δj
1 = g
hjcj+Hjdj
1 = (g
cj
1 )
hj (g
dj
1 )
Hj = C
hj
j D
Hj
j
for j = 1, 2, · · · , t. Therefore, the proposed TPASS protocol based zero-knowledge
proof has correctness.
3.4. Efficiency
Efficiency of the proposed TPASS protocol based on two-phase com-350
mitment. In the first proposed protocol, the client needs to compute 7 expo-
nentiations in G and send or receive 5 group elements in G. Each server needs
to compute t+10 exponentiations in G and send or receive 4t+5 group elements
in G.
The client involves only two communication rounds with the gateway, i.e.,355
sending msgC to the gateway and receiving msgS from the gateway. Each server
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Si participates in six communication rounds with other servers and the gateway,
i.e., receiving msgC from the gateway, broadcasting the commitment 〈IDC , δi〉
to other servers, receiving 〈IDC , δj〉 for all j 6= i from other servers, broadcasting
〈IDC , Bi, Ci, Di〉, receiving 〈IDC , Bj , Cj , Dj〉 for all j 6= i, and finally sending360
msg∗i to the gateway.
The performance comparison of Camenisch et al. protocol [6] (with provable
security in the UC framework) and the proposed protocol (with provable security
in the standard model) can be shown in Tab. 1.
In Table 1, exp. represent the computation complexity of a modular expo-365
nentiation, |g| is the size of a group element in G and |q| is the size of a group
element in Zq, C, S and G stand for Client, Server and Gateway, respectively.
In addition, pk =
∏
epki, tpk =
∏
tpki. In Camenisch et al. protocol [6], a hash
value is counted as half a group element.
In our initialization, the client secret-shares the password, secret and the370
digest of the secret with the n servers via n secure channels which may be
established with PKI. In the setup protocol of Camenisch et al., the client setups
the shares with the n servers based on PKI. The proposed retrieval protocol does
not rely on PKI, but the retrieval protocol of Camenisch et al. still requires PKI.
In view of this, the proposed retrieval protocol can be implemented easier than375
Camenisch et al. retrieval protocol.
From Table 1, we can see that the proposed retrieval protocol is signifi-
cantly more efficient than the retrieval protocol of Camenisch et al. not only
in communication rounds for client but also in computation and communica-
tion complexities. In particular, the performance of the client in the proposed380
retrieval protocol is independent of the number of the servers and the threshold.
Efficiency of the proposed TPASS protocol based on zero-knowledge
proof. The second proposed protocol has the same initialization, client retrieval
request and client secret retrieval as the first proposed protocol.
In the retrieval response, each server Si participates in four communication385
rounds with other servers and the gateway, i.e., receiving msgC from the gateway,
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Table 1: Performance Comparison of the Camenisch et al. Protocol and the Proposed Proto-
cols
Camenisch et al. [6] Protocol 1 Protocol 2
Public Keys C: username C: username
S: Si: epki, spki, tpki S Si: none
Private Keys C: pwC C: pwC
S: Si: eski, sski, tski S: Si: f1(i), f2(i), f3(i) where
E(pwC , pk), E(s, pk)
∑
aif1(i) = pwC ,
∑
aif2(i) = s
E(pwC , tpk), E(s, tpk) and
∑
aif3(i) = H(g
s
2)
Setup Comp. C: 5n+ 15 (exp.) C: 3n polynomial evaluations
Complexity S: n+ 18 (exp.) S: none
Setup Comm. n(2.5n+ 18.5)|g| C: 3n|q|
Complexity S: 3|q|
Setup Comm. 4 C: 1
Round S: 1
Retrieve Comp. C: 14t+ 24 (exp.) C: 7 (exp.) C: 7 (exp.)
Complexity S: 7t+ 28 (exp.) S: t+ 10 (exp.) S: 3t+ 10 (exp.)
G: 0 (exp.) G: 0 (exp.)
Retrieve Comm. (t+ 1)(36.5 + 2.5n C: 5|g| C: 5|g|
Complexity +10.5(t+ 1))|g| S: (4t+ 5)|g| S: (3t+ 5)|g|+ t|q|
G: (4t+ 5)|g| G: (4t+ 5)|g|
Retrieve Comm. 10 C: 2 / S: 6 C: 2 / S: 4
Rounds G: 4 G: 4
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broadcasting 〈IDC , Bi, Ci, Di, δi〉 to other servers, receiving 〈IDC , Bj , Cj , Dj , δj〉
for all j 6= i from other servers, and finally sending msg∗i to the gateway.
The performance of the second proposed protocol is also shown in Table 1,
comparing with the performance of Camenisch et al. protocol [6] and the first390
proposed protocol.
From Table 1, we can see that the retrieval computation complexity of the
second proposed protocol in a server is more than that in the first proposed
protocol, but is much less than that in Camenisch et al. protocol. The retrieval
communication complexity of the second proposed protocol in a server is less395
than that in the first proposed protocol because |q| is less than |g|. In addition,
the second proposed protocol has reduce the communications among serves from
two phases to one phase. The total communication overhead for each proposed
protocol is also much less than that in Camenisch et al. protocol.
4. Security Analysis400
4.1. Security Analysis of the Proposed TPASS Protocol Based on Two-Phase
Commitment
Based on the security model defined in Section 2, we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. Assuming that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [7] is405
hard over {G, q, g1}, then the proposed TPASS protocol P based on two-phase
commitment illustrated in Fig. 2 is secure against the passive attack according
to Definition 1.
Proof. In the security analysis, we consider the worst case where t− 1 servers
have been corrupted. Without loss of generality, we assume that the first server410
S1 is honest and the rest have been corrupted.
Given a passive adversary A attacking the protocol, we imagine a simulator
S that runs the protocol for A.
First of all, the simulator S initializes the system by generating public pa-
rameters params = {G, q, g1, g2, H}. Next, Server = {S1,S2, · · · ,Sn} and Client415
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sets are determined. For each C ∈ Client, a password pwC and a secret sC are
chosen at random and then secret-shared with the n servers. In addition, the
digest of the secret H(sC) is also secret-shared with the n servers.
The public parameters params and the shares {IDC , i, f1(i), f2(i), f3(i)} for
i = 2, 3, · · · , t are provided to the adversary. When answering to any oracle420
query, the simulator S provides the adversary A with the internal state of the
corrupted servers Si (i = 2, 3, · · · , t).
We refer to the real execution of the experiment, as described above, as P0.
We introduce a sequence of transformations to the experiment P0 and bound
the effect of each transformation on the adversary’s advantage. We then bound425
the adversary’s advantage in the final experiment. This immediately yields a
bound on the adversary’s advantage in the original experiment.
Experiment P1: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adversary
A as in experiment P0 except that the adversary’s queries to Execute oracles
are handled differently: in any Execute(C, i,S), where the adversary A has not430
queried corrupt(C), the password pwC in msgC = 〈IDC , A〉 where A = gr1gpwC2
are replaced with a random pw in Z∗q .
Because r in A = gr1g
pwC
2 is randomly chosen from Z∗q by the simulator, the
adversary cannot distinguish gr1g
pwC
2 with g
r
1g
pw
2 . Otherwise, we can break the
semantic security of the ElGamal encryption, i.e., given an ElGamal encryption435
(gr,myr) where m is either g
pwC
2 or g
pw
2 , g is a generator of G, and y = g1,
determine if it is an encryption of g
pwC
2 . The semantic security of the ElGamal
encryption is built on the DDH assumption. Therefore, we have
Claim 1. If the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1}, |AdvP0PA(k)− AdvP1PA(k)|
is negligible.440
Experiment P2: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adversary
A as in experiment P1 except that: for any Execute(C, i,S) oracle, where the
adversary A has not queried corrupt(C) and corrupt(S1), a1f1(1) in msg1 =
〈IDC , δ1, B1, C1, D1〉 where B1 = gr11 ga1f1(1)2 is replaced by a random number
in Z∗q .445
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Because r1 in B1 = g
r1
1 g
a1f1(1)
2 is randomly chosen from Z∗q by the simulator,
the adversary cannot distinguish gr11 g
a1f1(1)
2 with g
r1
1 g
α
2 , where α is a random
number in Z∗q .
Claim 2. If the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1}, |AdvP1PA(k)− AdvP2PA(k)|
is negligible.450
Experiment P3: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adver-
sary A as in experiment P2 except that: for any Execute(C, i,S) oracle, where
the adversary A has not queried corrupt(C) and corrupt(S1), E1 in msg∗1 =
〈IDC , C,D,E1, F1〉 is replaced with a random element in the group G.
The difference between the current experiment and the previous one is455
bounded by the probability to solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) prob-
lem over {G, q, g1}. More precisely, we have
Claim 3. If the DDH problem over {G, q, g1} is hard, |AdvP2PA(k)− AdvP3PA(k)|
is negligible.
If |AdvP2PA(k)−AdvP3PA(k)| is non-negligible, we show that the simulator can460
use A as a subroutine to solve the DDH problem with non-negligible probability
as follows.
Given a DDH problem (gx1 , g
y
1 , Z), where x, y are randomly chosen from Z∗q
and Z is either gxy1 or a random element z from G, the simulator replaces gr1 in
A = gr1g
pwC
2 with g
x
1 , C1 = g
c1
1 with g
y
1 , and (g
c1
1 , g
c1r
1 ) in
E1 = g
a1f2(1)h1
2 g
−r1
∑t
j=1 cj
1 g
c1
∑t
j=1 rj
1 g
c1r
1
with gy1 , Z, respectively, where rj (j = 1, 2, · · · , t) and cj (j = 2, 3, · · · , t) are
randomly chosen by the simulator. When Z = gxy, the experiment is the same
as the experiment P2. When Z is a random element z in G, the experiment is the465
same as the experiment P3. If the adversary can distinguish the experiments
P2 and P3 with non-negligible probability, the simulator can solve the DDH
problem with non-negligible probability.
Experiment P4: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adver-
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sary A as in experiment P3 except that: for any Execute(C, i,S) oracle, where470
the adversary A has not queried corrupt(C) and corrupt(S1), F1 in msg∗1 =
〈IDC , C,D,E1, F1〉 is replaced with a random element in the group G.
Like the experiment P3, we have
Claim 4. If the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1}, |AdvP3PA(k)− AdvP4PA(k)|
is negligible.475
In experiment P4, msgC , msg1, msg
∗
1 in Execute oracles have become inde-
pendent of the password pwC used by the client C and the secret sC and g
H(sC)
2
in the view of the adversary A, if A has not require Corrupt(C) and Corrupt(S1).
In view of this, any off-line dictionary attack cannot succeed.
Experiment P5: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adversary480
A as in experiment P4 except that: for any Execute(C, i,S) oracle, where the
adversary A has not queried corrupt(C) and corrupt(S1), the secret sC of the
client is replaced with a random element in the group G.
Given a DDH problem (gx1 , g
y
1 , Z), where x, y are randomly chosen from Z∗q
and Z is either gxy1 or a random element z from G, the simulator replaces gr1 in
A = gr1g
pwC
2 with g
x
1 , C1 = g
c1
1 with g
y
1 , and (g
r
1, g
c1r
1 ) in
sC = (E/C
r)h
−1
= (E/(g
r
∑t
i=2 ci
1 g
rc1
1 ))
h−1
with gx1 , Z, respectively, where h = H(IDC , A,C,D), cj (j = 2, 3, · · · , t) are
randomly chosen by the simulator. When Z = gxy, the experiment is the same485
as the experiment P4. When Z is a random element z in G, the experiment is the
same as the experiment P5. If the adversary can distinguish the experiments
P4 and P5 with non-negligible probability, the simulator can solve the DDH
problem with non-negligible probability. Therefore, we have
Claim 5. If the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1}, |AdvP4PA(k)− AdvP5PA(k)|490
is negligible.
In experiment P5, when the passive adversary A queries the Test(C, i) oracle,
the simulator S chooses a random bit b. When the adversary completes its
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execution and outputs a bit b′, the simulator can tell whether the adversary
succeeds by checking if (1) Test(C, i) query was made regarding some fresh495
client C, and (2) b′ = b.
The passive adversary’s probability of correctly guessing the bit b used by the
Test oracle is exactly 1/2 when the Test query is made to a fresh client instance
Ci invoked by an Execute(C, i,S) oracle. This is so because the secret sC is
chosen at random from G, and hence there is no way to distinguish whether the500
Test oracle outputs a random secret or the “actual” secret (which is a random
element, anyway). Therefore, AdvP5PA(k) = 2 · 1/2 − 1 = 0. Based on Claims
1-5, we know |AdvP0PA(k) − AdvP5PA(k)| is negligible. According to Definition 1,
the protocol is secure against the passive attack and the theorem is proved. 4
Theorem 2. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1} and505
H is a collision-resistant hash function, then the proposed TPASS protocol P
based on two-phase commitment illustrated in Fig. 2 is secure against the active
attack according to Definition 2.
Proof. Like in the proof of Theorem 1, we consider the worst case where t− 1
servers have been corrupted. The worst case can be divided into two subcases:510
(i) in the protocol, there is one honest server which has not been compromised
by the adversary; (ii) all servers in the protocol are dishonest and controlled by
the adversary.
For the first subcase, without loss of generality, we assume that the first server
S1 is honest and the rest have been corrupted. Because of the inspection of the515
honest server, the published public parameters G, g1, g2, q cannot be changed
and no one knows the discrete logarithm of g2 based on g1. Otherwise, it turns
to the second subcase. This proof concentrates on the instances invoked by Send
oracles. We view the adversary’s queries to its Send oracles as queries to four
different oracles as follows:520
• Send(C, i) represents a request for instance Ci of client C to initiate the
protocol. The output of this query is msgC = 〈IDC , A〉.
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• Send(S1, j, C,msgC) represents sending message msgC to instance Sj1 of the
server S1, supposedly from the client C. The input of this query is msgC =
〈IDC , A〉 and the output of this query is msg1 = 〈IDC , δ1, B1, C1, D1〉.525
• Send(S1, j, S2,S3, · · · ,St,M) represents sending message M to instance Sj1
of the server S1, supposedly from the servers S2,S3, · · · ,St. The input of
this query is M = msg2‖msg3‖ · · · ‖msgt and the output of this query is
msg∗1 = 〈IDC , C,D,E1, F1〉 or ⊥.
• Send(C, i,msgS) represents sending the message msgS to instance Ci of530
the client C. The input of this query is msgS = 〈IDC , C,D,E, F 〉 and the
output of this query is either acciC = TRUE or ⊥.
We will use some terminologies throughout the proof. A given message is
called oracle-generated if it was output by the simulator in response to some
oracle query. The message is said to be adversarially-generated otherwise. An535
adversarially-generated message must not be the same as any oracle-generated
message.
We say an active adversary A succeeds if it makes an query Send(C, i,msgS)
to a fresh client instance Ci with an adversarially-generated message msgS ,
resulting in acciC = TRUE. We denote this event by SuccA.540
Experiment P6: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adversary
as P0 except that the adversary does not succeed, and the experiment is aborted,
if any of the following occurs:
1. At any point during the experiment, an oracle-generated message (e.g.,
msgC , msg1, or msg
∗
1) is repeated.545
2. At any point during the experiment, a collision occurs in the hash function
H (regardless of whether this is due to a direct action of the adversary,
or whether this occurs during the course of the simulator’s response to an
oracle query).
It is immediate that events 1 occurs with only negligible probability, event 2550
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occurs with negligible probability assuming H as collision-resistant hash func-
tions. Put everything together, we are able to see that
Claim 6. If H is a collision-resistant hash function, |AdvP0AA(k)− AdvP6AA(k)| is
negligible.
Experiment P7: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adversary555
A as in experiment P6 except that (1) the adversary’s queries to Send(C, i) or-
acles are handled differently: in any Send(C, i), where the adversary A has not
queried corrupt(C), the password pwC in msgC = 〈IDC , A〉 where A = gr1gpwC2
is replaced with a random number pw in Z∗q ; (2) the adversary’s queries to
Send(S1, j, C,msgC) oracles are handled differently: in any Send(S1, j, C,msgC),560
where the adversary A has not queried corrupt(C) and corrupt(S1), a1f1(1) in
msg1 = 〈IDC , B1, C1, D1〉 where B1 = gr11 ga1f1(1)2 is replaced by a random num-
ber in Z∗q ; (3) the adversary’s queries to Send(S1, j, S2, · · · ,St, msg2‖ · · · ‖msgt)
oracles are handled differently: in any Send(S1, j, S2, · · · ,St, msg2‖ · · · ‖msgt),
where A has not queried corrupt(C) and corrupt(S1), E1 and F1 in msg∗1 =565
〈IDC , C,D,E1, F1〉 are replaced with random elements in the group G.
Like in experiments P1 and P2, the changes (1) and (2) will only bring a
negligible change to the advantage of the active adversary.
For the change (3), if msgC ,msg2,msg3, · · · ,msgt are all oracle-generated,
we can replace E1 with a random element in G as in the experiment P3.570
If some of msgC ,msg2,msg3, · · · ,msgt are adversarially-generated, the ad-
versary A cannot produce A, (Bj , Cj , Dj) (j = 2, 3, · · · , t), such as A
∏t
j=1Bj
excludes B1 and δj = g
H(IDC ,A,Bj ,Cj ,Dj)
1 for j = 2, 3, · · · , t still hold because A
and the commitments δj (j = 2, 3, · · · , t) must be broadcast and received by the
server S1 at first and H is a collision-resistant hash function.575
Because B1 = g
r1
1 g
a1f1(1)
2 , we have
E1 = g
a1f2(1)h1
2 C
−r1(A
t∏
j=1
Bj)
ci
= g
a1f2(1)h1
2 C
−r1(A
t∏
j=2
Bj)
cigc1r11 (g
c1
2 )
a1f1(1).
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Given a DDH problem (gx1 , g
y
1 , Z), where x, y are randomly chosen from Z∗q
and Z is either gxy1 or a random element z from G, the simulator replaces g2 with
gx1 , C1 = g
c1
1 with g
y
1 , and (g
c1
1 , g
c1
2 ) in the above E1 with g
y
1 , Z, respectively,
where r1 is randomly chosen by the simulator. When Z = g
xy, the experiment580
is the same as the experiment P6. When Z is a random element z in G, the
experiment is the same as the experiment P7.
In the same way, we can make the change (4).
Because no one knows the discrete logarithm x of g2 based on g1, if the
adversary can distinguish the experiments P6 and P7 with non-negligible proba-585
bility, the simulator can solve the DDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Therefore, we have
Claim 7. If the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1}, |AdvP6AA(k)− AdvP7AA(k)|
is negligible.
In experiment P7, msgC , msg1, msg
∗
1 in Send oracles have become indepen-590
dent of the password pwC used by the client C and the secret sC and g
H(sC)
2 in
the view of the adversary A, if A has not require Corrupt(C) and Corrupt(S1).
In view of this, any off-line dictionary attack cannot succeed.
To evaluate Pr[SuccA], we consider three cases as follows.
Case 1. The adversary A forges msg′C = 〈IDC , A′〉 where A′ = gr
′
1 g
pw′C
2 by595
choosing his own r′ from Z∗q and pw′C from the dictionary D. In this case, if
SuccA occurs, the adversary can conclude that the password used by the client
is pw′C . Therefore, the probability Pr[SuccA] = Q1(k)/N , where Q1(k) denotes
the number of queries to Send(S1, j, C,msgC) oracle.
Case 2. Given msgC = 〈IDC , A〉, the adversaryA forges msgS = 〈IDC , C ′, D′,600
E′, F ′〉 by choosing his own s′, c′, d′ from Z∗q and pw′C from the dictionary D
and computing C ′ = gc
′
1 , D
′ = gd
′
1 , E
′ = gs
′h′
2 (Ag
pw′C
2 )
c′ , F ′ = gH(g
s′
2 )h
′
2 (Ag
pw′C
2 )
d′
where h′ = H(IDC , A,C ′, D′). When pwC = pw
′
C , we have acc
i
C = TRUE.
Therefore, in this case, the probability Pr[SuccA] = Q2(k)/N , where Q2(k)
denotes the number of queries to Send(C, i,msgS) oracle.605
Case 3. Given msgC = 〈IDC , A〉, the adversary A forwards msgC to the
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server S1 twice to get two responses 〈IDC , C1, D1, E1, F1〉 and 〈IDC , C ′1, D′1, E′1,
F ′1〉. Then the adversary A sends to the client a forged message msgS =
〈IDC , C ′1/C1, D′1/D1, gs
∗h∗
2 E
′
1/E1, g
H(gs
∗
2 )h
∗
2 F
′
1/F1〉, where E′1/E1 = gs(h
′−h)
1
(C ′1/C1)
r, F ′1/F1 = g
H(gs1)(h
′−h)
1 (D
′
1/D1)
r, h = H(IDC , A,C,D), h
′ = H(IDC , A,610
C ′, D′), h∗ = H(IDC , A,C ′1/C1, D
′
1/D1) and s
∗ is chosen from Z∗q by the ad-
versary. The client accepts msgS if and only if h
′ = h. Because H is a collision-
resistant hash function, the probability Pr[SuccA] is negligible in this case.
In summary, in experiment P7, Pr[SuccA] = Q(k)/N , where Q(k) denotes
the number of on-line attacks. Based on Claims 6-7, we know |AdvP0PA(k) −615
AdvP7PA(k)| is negligible. According to Definition 2, the protocol is secure against
the active attack in the first subcase. 4
For the second subcase, all servers in the protocol are dishonest and con-
trolled by the adversary, the active adversary can cheat the client with forged
public parameters G, q, g1, g2. However, the client can check if q is a large prime620
and gq1 = g
q
2 = 1 so that the discrete logarithm over G is hard although the
adversary may know the discrete of g2 based on g1.
In this case, the active adversary can only query two Send oracles: Send(C, i)
and Send(C, i,msgS).
Experiment P8: In this experiment, the simulator interacts with A as in exper-625
iment P0 except that the adversary’s queries to Send(C, i) oracles are handled
differently: in any Send(C, i), where the adversary A has not queried corrupt(C),
the password pwC in msgC = 〈IDC , A〉 where A = gr1gpwC2 is replaced with a
random number pw in Z∗q .
Like in experiment P1, if the adversary can distinguish g
r
1g
pwC
2 with g
r
1g
pw
2 ,630
we can break the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption. Therefore, we
have
Claim 8. If the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1}, |AdvP0AA(k)− AdvP8AA(k)|
is negligible.
In experiment P8, the adversary can only perform the active attack as de-635
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scribed in Case 2 of experiment P7. In this case, the probability Pr[SuccA] =
Q2(k)/N , where Q2(k) denotes the number of queries to Send(C, i,msgS) oracle.
Based on Claim 8, we know |AdvP0PA(k)−AdvP8PA(k)| is negligible. According
to Definition 2, the protocol is secure against the active attack in the second
subcase.640
This completes the proof of the theorem. 4
4.2. Security Analysis of the Proposed TPASS Protocol Based on Zero-Knowledge
Proof
Before analyzing the security of the second proposed protocol, we introduce
an assumption about non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge as fol-645
lows.
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Assumption.
Considering a protocol where Prover, wishing to prove to Verifier that he knows
x such that y = gx, sends (R = gr, α = H(g, y,R)x + r) (where r is randomly
chosen by Prover) to Verifier, who accepts the proof if gα = yH(g,r,R)R and650
otherwise rejects the proof. We assume that in this protocol, Prover has to know
x to generate the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (R,α) such
that gα = yH(g,r,R)R and Verifier gains no knowledge of x after the proof.
Theorem 3. Assuming that DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1} and the non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge assumption holds, the proposed655
TPASS protocol P based on zero-knowledge proof illustrated in Fig. 3 is secure
against the passive attack according to Definition 1.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 1, except from Claims 3 and
4.
Claim 3’. If the DDH problem over {G, q, g1} is hard and the non-interactive660
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge assumption holds, |AdvP2PA(k) − AdvP3PA(k)|
is negligible.
If E1 = g
a1f2(1)h1
2 C
−r1(A
∏t
j=1Bj)
ci contains B1 = g
r1
1 g
a1f1(1)
2 , Claim 3’
can be proved to be true in the same way as the proof of Theorem 1. If E1
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does not contain B1, E1 must contain g
r1c1
1 because C = g
∑
cj
1 and the zero-665
knowledge proof of knowledge assumption ensures the server Sj knowing cj
such that Cj = g
cj
1 . Given C1 = g
c1
1 and g
r1
1 = B1g
∑
j 6=1 ajf1(j)
2 /g
pw
2 (where
pw is chosen for offline dictionary attack), the t − 1 servers S2, · · · , St cannot
distinguish gr1c11 with a random group element due to the DDH assumption.
Note that the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge assumption ensures the server670
Sj (j 6= 1) having no knowledge of c1. Therefore, Claim 3’ is true.
Claim 4’. If the DDH problem over {G, q, g1} is hard and the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge assumption holds, |AdvP3PA(k) − AdvP4PA(k)|
is negligible.
The proof can be obtained from the proof of Claim 3’ by replacing E1, C, Cj , cj675
with F1, D,Dj , dj . Please note that (Cj , Dj , δj) is also a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge of dj . 4
Theorem 4. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard over {G, q, g1}, the
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge assumption holds, and H is
a collision-resistant hash function, then the proposed TPASS protocol P based680
on zero-knowledge proof illustrated in Fig. 3 is secure against the active attack
according to Definition 2.
Theorem 4 can be proved by combining the proofs of Theorems 1-3.
5. Experiments
Experiments have been carried out to validate the performance of the pro-685
posed two protocols. The experiments are performed with the following hard-
ware specifications: CPU: 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7, Memory: 16 GB 1600 MHz
DDR3.
We implemented the proposed two protocols with JRE System Library
[JavaSE - 1.7] in the settings where there are 3, 5, 10, 15, 20 servers, respectively.690
In our experiments, the size of a group element (i.e, |g|) has 1024 bits and the
order of the group (i.e, |q|) has 160 bits. One modular exponentiation for 160-bit
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Figure 4: Comparison of time spent (in seconds) for setting up
exponent takes approximately 0.0028 seconds and one modular multiplication
takes approximate 0.000005 seconds.
In the following discussion, we mainly compare the performance of our pro-695
tocols with Camenisch et al. protocol [6].
5.1. Performance of Initialization
For n = 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, the performance of the proposed two protocols per
client in the initialisation, comparing with Camenisch et al. protocol [6], is
illustrated in Fig. 4-5.700
Because the proposed two protocols have the same initialization, their per-
formance are the same.
In order to make the performance of the proposed protocols visible in the
comparison, the computational and communication complexities of the proposed
protocols for a client have been enlarged by 20 times.705
Form Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we can see that the proposed protocols are significant
more efficient than Camenisch et al.’s protocol and the difference increases with
the increase of the number of servers (n).
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Figure 5: Comparison of communication size (in KB) for setting up
Figure 6: Comparison of time spent for retrieving
5.2. Performance of Retrieve
For t = 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, the performance of the proposed two protocols per710
client in the retrieval, comparing with Camenisch et al. protocol [6], is illustrated
in Fig. 6-7.
From Fig. 6, we can see that the total running time of the proposed two
protocols per client is less than Camenisch et al.’s protocol. We save up to
95% in the first proposed protocol and 85% in the second proposed protocol.715
Although the difference is just a couple of seconds for a client, it will become
significantly large when the servers provide services to a large number of clients
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Figure 7: Comparison of communication size for retrieving
concurrently. If we ignore the communication time, the verification of the second
proposed protocol is a little bit slower that the first proposed protocol. However,
if the communication time cannot be ignored, the second proposed protocol720
may be more efficient than the first proposed protocol because it reduces the
communications of the servers from two phases to one phase.
The communication overhead of Camenisch et al.’s protocol depends on the
total number n of the servers. In Fig. 7, we assume n = t+ 1. In addition, we
assume that the broadcast channel in the proposed two protocols is implemented725
by point to point communication. In this case, the total communication over-
heads of the proposed two protocols are (4t2 +5t)|g| bits and (3t2 +5t)|g|+ t2|q|
bits, respectively.
From Fig. 7, we can see that the proposed two protocols have almost the
same communication overhead, which is significant less than Camenisch et al.’s730
protocol. We save up to 65% in the first proposed protocol and 75% in the
second proposed protocol.
In addition, for t = 10, the performance of the proposed two protocols
per server in the retrieval, comparing with Camenisch et al. protocol [6], is
illustrated in Fig. 8-9, which also shows that the proposed protocols are more735
efficient than Camenisch et al.’s protocol.
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Figure 8: Comparison of average time spent by a server for retrieving
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented two efficient t-out-of-n TPASS protocols for
any n > t that protects the password of the client when he tries to retrieve his
secret from all corrupt servers as well as prevents the adversary from planting740
a different secret into the user’s mind than the secret that he stored earlier.
The proposed protocols are significantly more efficient than existing TPASS
protocols. Furthermore, we have provided a rigorous proof of security for the
proposed protocols in the standard model and performed some experiments.
Our future work will study how efficiently to detect the corrupted servers745
and implement the proposed protocol in light-weight mobile devices to support
cloud-based services.
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Figure 9: Comparison of average communication size for a server in retrieving
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